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INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
occupies a unique posidon among the thirteen federal courts of
appeals. Hearing cases nadonwide, the Federal Circuit exercises
jurisdiction over specific subject matters, including internadonal
trade, government contracts, patents, trademarks, certain money
claims against the United States government, federal personnel,
veterans benefits, and public safety officers' benefits claims.' The
Federal Circuit is frequendy called upon to review decisions from the
United States Court of International Trade, the United States Court
of Federal Claims, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims, and federal district courts.^
This Árdele provides a summary of the internadonal trade cases
appealed to the Federal Circuit from the United States Court of
International Trade (CIT) and die United States International Trade
Commission (ITC or Commission) during 2011. Twenty-four
precedential decisions were issued, addressing United States Customs
Laws, Trade Remedy Laws, and other international trade issues. Of
the twenty-one precedential decisions arising from the CIT, the
Federal Circuit affirmed nine and reversed or vacated eleven.^ Six of
the cases involved challenges to tariff classificadons; three cases
involved quesdons about the scope of the CIT's jurisdiction; one case
involved jurisdictional issues in filing certificates of origin; four cases
involved challenges to Commerce's authority to impose duties; five
cases involved challenges to Commerce's methods of calculating
duties, including its controversial pracdce of zeroing; and one case
involved review of proceedings tainted by material fraud. Of the
three precedential opinions arising from ITC decisions pursuant to
1. See Court Jurisdiction, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2012) (listing some of the subject areas over which the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has jurisdiction).
2. Established on October 1, 1982 under Article III of the Constitution, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit "was formed by the merger of
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate division of
the United States Court of Claims. The court is located in the Howard T. Markey
National Courts Building on historic Lafayette Square in Washington, D.C." Id. See
generally U.S. CONST art. Ill, § 1 (providing for the creation of '^ inferior courts" by
Congress); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006) (providing that the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit maintains exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from specific federal
courts of first instance).
5. One precedential opinion concerned a denial of a panel rehearing and
hearing en bane in which Judges Reyna, Newman, and O'Malley respectfully
dissented from the denial. See Papierfabrik August Koehler AG v. United States, 646
F.5d 904 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ) (per curiam) ; iee also infra Part m.B.
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Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, two ITC decisions were affirmed
and one was vacated. *
This Article is divided into four sections: jurisdiction of the U.S.
Court of International Trade, U.S. customs laws, antidumping and
countervailing duties, and ITC section 337 cases. The cases involve
the three federal agencies that often appear as parties before the
Federal Circuit and CIT in trade disputes: United States Customs
and Border Protection (Customs), the United States Department of
Commerce (Commerce), and the ITC.
I. JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The CIT is charged with exclusive jurisdiction to review a variety of
trade-related issues pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581. In particular, §
1581 (i) provides for jurisdiction over any civil action commenced
against the United States that arises out of any law providing for
tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of
merchandise.^ Although the residual jurisdictional provision of §
1581 (i) grants broad jurisdiction to the CIT, the Federal Circuit has
limited its scope by only allowing it to be invoked when jurisdiction is
unavailable under another subsection.^
In Hartford Eire Insurance Co. v. United States,^ the CIT dismissed a
suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that a surety was barred from
suing to challenge its liability because it failed to timely file an
administrative protest under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 and therefore could
not bring suit under the residual jurisdiction provision of 28 U.S.C. §
1581 (i).^ On appeal, the Federal Circuit questioned the CIT's
determination that the surety's failure to comply with the protest
period under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 barred jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1581 (i) because the surety did not learn of the protest until after the
statutory window had closed.^
In this case, Sunline Business Solutions (Sunline) used a surety
bond from the Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford) to
import frozen cooked crawfish from the People's Republic of
4. For a table of precedential opinions issued in 2011, see the Addendum to this
Article, which lists the case name, agency involved and the Federal Circuit's ruling.
5. 28U.S.C. §1581(i) (2006).
6. See Int'l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 467 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (stating that jurisdiction under § 1581 (i) may not be invoked if jurisdiction is
also available under § 1581 (a) ).
7. 648 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
8. Id. at 1373-74.
9. M at 1372.
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China.'" Customs sought to obtain payment from Hartford when
Sunline failed to pay antidumping duties levied on the transaction."
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514, Hartford had 90 days from the demand
of payment against its bonds to file an administrative protest, and it
failed to meet the deadline.'^ Several months after the deadline,
Hartford learned that Customs commenced an investigation into
Sunline more than a month before Hartford began issuing surety
bonds to Sunline.'^ Since Hartford missed its opportunity for § 1514
jurisdiction, it filed suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i), claiming that
Customs' failure to disclose the investigation to Hartford prior to its
issuance of the surety bond constituted a material misrepresentation,
thus making the bonds voidable.'''
The CIT held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the
residual jurisdiction provision of § 1581 (i) because Hartford's surety
claims fell within the scope of § 1514(c)(3) and Hartford failed to
timely file a protest as required urider the provision.'^ Hartford
argued that it did not learn of the basis of the cause of action until
after the protest period expired, but the CIT held that Hartford
"could and should have reasonably known of the existence of its
present claims" within the window of time to protest."'
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that Hartford could not
have discovered the potential protest grounds through the exercise of
routine due diligence by the end of the protest period.'^ The Federal
Circuit instead determined that if the grounds for administrative
protest were not known and could not have reasonably been known
until after the § 1514 protest period expired, § 1581 (i) was an
appropriate jurisdictional basis for bringing suit; consequendy, the
Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the case.'^
In Hitachi Home Electronics (America), Inc. v. United States,^^ the
Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's determination that it lacked
jurisdiction.^" Hitachi filed a protest vñth Customs when it was
10. Id.; 19 C.F.R. § 142.4 (2011) requires importers to post security bonds to
cover potential fines.
11. //aní/orá/'¿re/7u., 648F.3datl373.
12. Id.
15. Id.
14. Id.
15. /¿.at 1374.
16. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1562, 1368 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2009), rev'd, 648 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
17. //art/orá/üre/w., 648 F.3d at 1375.
18. Id. at 1374 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 923 F.2d 850, 834
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
19. 661 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
20. Id. at 1344.
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charged a duty of 5.0% ad valorem on plasma flat panel televisions
made or assembled in Mexico and imported to the United States,
claiming that the items should be duty-free under the North
American Free Trade Agreement.^' Under 19 U.S.C. § 1515(a),
Customs is required to allow or deny protests within two years of
filing.^^ After Customs failed to respond within the two-year window,
Hitachi filed an action in the CIT and asserted jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1581 (a) ,^ * arguing for constructive denial or allowance of the
protest after expiration of § 1515(a) 's two-year vdndow. Alternatively,
Hitachi asserted jurisdiction under the residual jurisdiction provision
of § 1581 (i).^ "* The CIT dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction,
"interpreting § 1515(a) to impose neither automatic allowance nor
automatic denial of a protest, and concluding that jurisdiction was
therefore not proper. "^ ^ Hitachi timely appealed.^ ®
As a matter of first impression, the Federal Circuit held that
Customs' failure to act on a protest within the two-year statutory
period of § 1515 (a) does not establish automatic allowance or denial
of a protest.^' The court noted that the Supreme Court has held that
"if a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance vñth
statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary
course impose their own coercive sanction."^® The Federal Circuit
has also refrained from imposing consequences for non-compliance
with statutoiy deadlines in the absence of express statutory
guidance.^^ The Federal Circuit further noted that § 1515(a)'s lack
of consequences provided a stark contrast to the explicit
consequence of § 1515(b).^° Section 1515(b) authorizes a request for
accelerated disposition of a protest; if Customs fails to allow or deny
the protest within 30 days of receipt of the request, the protest vñll be
deemed denied.*' Hitachi failed to avail itself of § 1515 (b) to force a
Customs decision.^ ^ As Customs had neither allowed nor denied
21. Id. See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (providing rules used to determine whether goods are
eligible for preferential NAFTA treatment).
22. 19U.S.C. §1515(a) (2006).
23. Hitachi Home Elees., 661 F.3d at 1344.
24. M. at 1345.
25. Id
26. Id
27. Id
28. Id. (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 63
(1993)).
29. Id. at 1347 (citing Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d
563 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
30. M. atl34&-49.
31. 19 U.S.C. §1515(b) (2006).
32. See Hitachi Home Elea., 661 F.3d at 1344 (stating that Hitachi only contended
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Hitachi's protest, the Federal Gircuit concluded that jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.G. § 1581 (a) was unavailable.^* The Federal Gircuit
held that jurisdiction under § 1581 (i) was unavailable as well because
the residual jurisdiction of § 1581 (i) can only be invoked when the
other provisions of § 1581 do not provide jurisdiction,^ "* and Hitachi
could have obtained jurisdicdon under § 1581 (a) by requesting
accelerated disposition and obtaining a default denial after 30 days of
Gustoms inaction pursuant to § 1515 (b).^ ^
In Almond Bros. Lumber Go. v. United States,^^ domestic producers of
softwood lumber who were not members of the Goalidon for Fair
Lumber (Goalition) filed an action in the GIT alleging that the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) failed to meet its obligations under 19
U.S.G. § 2411 when it entered into a Softwood Lumber Agreement
(SLA) with Ganada, providing for the distribution of returned duties
only to Goalition members.*' Section 2411 authorizes the USTR to
enter into binding agreements with foreign countries to remedy
unfair trade practices, but requires the USTR to protect the interests
of the entire affected domestic industry.**
The government argued that the GIT lacked jurisdiction because
the agreement was negotiated pursuant to the broad authority to act
on behalf of die president under 19 U.S.G. § 2l7l(c) (1)(G), not §
2411.3« ^^ Yhile §2411 gives rise to GIT jurisdiction under 28 U.S.G. §
1581 (i), § 2171 does not allow for GIT review.""
The GIT dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, holding that there was insufficient evidence to conclude
that the SLA was a product of § 2411 negotiations because the USTR
failed to comply with its procedural requirements.*' The GIT
determined that the USTR entered into the SLA under its more
general authority to act on behalf of the President, under § 2171;
therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction.''^
The Federal Gircuit reversed the GIT and held that there was
that its protest was denied under § 1515(a)).
55. W. at 1350.
34. Id. (cidng Miller & Co. v. United States, 824 F.2d 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
55. Id.
56. 651F.5dl545(Fed. Cir. 2011).
57. Id. at 1548.
58. 19U.S.C. §2411(c)(4) (2006).
59. AlmondBros., 651 F.3d at 1350.
40. Id. (cidng Conoco, Inc. v. U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 18 F.5d 1581, 1586
(Fed. Cir. 1994)) (emphasizing that 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i) grants the CIT broad
residual jurisdicdon over matters reladng to imports).
41. 7á. at 1548.
42. Id. at 1349 (cidng U.S. CONST, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(l)(C)
(2006)).
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proper jurisdiction under § 1581 (i) because the SLA was negodated
pursuant to § 2411 authority.*^ The Federal Circuit highlighted the
lengthy history of the longstanding Canadian softwood dispute—
much of which indisputably involved USTR action under the
authority of § 2411—and determined that there was ample basis on
which to conclude that the SLA, like similar agreements before it, was
entered into under the authority of § 2411.'*'' The Federal Circuit
held that investigadon and negotiation for a prior SLA was sufficient
to meet the § 2411 statutory procedural requirements of public
notice and an opportunity for response.''^ According to the court,
statutory construction, legislative history, and background statements
from the negotiations indicated that § 2411 authorized the USTR to
formally enter into the SLA."*^  Therefore, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the suit was within the CIT's § 1581 (i) jurisdicdon
and remanded the case.*'
In Eord Motor Co. v. United States,"^^ the Federal Circuit held that the
requirement of a cerdficate of origin for preferendal treatment
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is not
jurisdictional."*^ This case arose out of "Ford's attempt to claim
preferential treatment under NAFTA for certain shipments of
automodve parts imported into the United States from Canada . . .
between January 1997 and January 1999."^ ° Under 19 U.S.C. §
1520(d), an importer must file a claim within one year of
importation.^' On June 27, 1997, the time at which the goods
entered the United States, Ford did not assert that the goods were
eligible for preferendal treatment under NAFTA.''^  Less than a year
later, on May 13, 1998, Ford electronically filed a post-entry duty
refund claim, but again failed to include the certificates of origin.^ ^
Finally, on November 5, 1998, over a year after the date of
importation. Ford filed the certificates of origin.^ * Customs then
denied Ford's claim for preferential treatment because the
certificates were not furnished within one year of importadon as
45.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
Mat 1351.
Id.
Id. at 1352-53.
Id. at 1554.
/d. at 1551.
655 F.3d 550 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 558.
Id. at 552.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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required by 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d).^^ Ford sought review by the
The CIT dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
finding that Ford had not filed a valid claim under Xerox Corp. v.
United State^^ and Corrpro Cos. Inc. v. United States,^^ which held that
"the timely filing of a claim under § 1520(d) was a jurisdictional
prerequisite."^® Ford timely appealed.
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the action, holding
that Ford's failure to file the certificates of origin within one year of
importation did not deprive the CIT of jurisdiction.™ The Federal
Circuit listed four bases to support its decision: "(1) Ford timely filed
notice of its claim; (2) Congress has not clearly labeled § 1520(d)'s
timely certificate filing requirement 'jurisdictional'; (3) § 1520(d) is
not a jurisdiction-granting provision; and (4) Customs possesses the
authority to waive the certificate filing requirement."®' The Federal
Circuit left it to the CIT to decide whether Customs was required to
accept Ford's late-filed certificates.®^
II. U.S. CUSTOMS LAWS
Customs is an agency within the United States Department of
Homeland Security responsible for ensuring "that all imports and
exports comply with U.S. laws and regulations."®^ The CIT handles
challenges to Customs' assessment and collection of Customs duties,
excise taxes, fees and penalties due on imported merchandise.®*
55. Id.; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d) (2006) (stating that "the Customs Service may
. . . reliquidate an entry to refund any excess duties . . . within 1 year after the date of
importation").
56. Eord Motor Co., 635 F.3d at 552.
57. 423 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
58. 433 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
59. Ford Motor Co., 635 F.3d at 553. The Federal Circuit noted that Xerox and
Corrpro held that "§ 1520(d)'s one year time limitation is jurisdictional insofar as it
requires the timely filing of a claim," but the question presented in Eord was "whether
submission of a certificate of origin together with the claim is also a jurisdictional
requirement," an issue not addressed in either Xerox or Corrpro. Id. at 554.
60. Id. at 557. In addition, the Federal Circuit rejected the government's
contention that, "even assuming the certificate of origin filing requirement is
nonjurisdictional, 'Ford's claims should still be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because there has been no protestable determination.'" Id. The Federal
Circuit reasoned that "where an importer properly files notice of its § 1520(d) claim
with Customs less than one year after entry. Customs renders a protestable
decision—for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (a)—if it denies the importer's claim."
Id. at 558.
61. M at 557.
62. Id. at 558.
63. U.S. Customs Service—More Than 200 Years of History, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PATROL, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/history/legacy/history2.xml (last
visitedApr. 9, 2012).
64. See About the Court: Jurisdiction of the Court, U.S. COURT OF INT'L TRADE,
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While appeals from customs decisions potentially include several
aspects of Customs law, all of the precedential customs decisions
reviewed by the Federal Circuit in 2011 related to tariff classifications.
Cases involving disputes about proper tariff classificadon are fact
specific and are only afforded precedential status when the case may
have broader implications for other cases.
When reviewing Customs' classifications, the Federal Circuit
utilizes the General Rules of Interpretation (GRIs) to interpret the
headings of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
(HTSUS).^ ^ The first rule (GRI 1) requires classification according to
the common and popular meaning of terms in the headings,
subheadings and explanatory notes.^ ^ The second rule (GRI 2)
requires classification of incomplete or unfinished articles in the
heading of the article's essential character.^' The third rule (GRI 3)
applies when merchandise is prima facie classifiable under two or
more headings or subheadings; under such circumstances, the rule
requires selection of the most specific description or selection of
heading that covers the article's essential character.^^
StoreWALL, LLG v. United Statei^ involved the classification of
imported wall panels and locator tabs for storeWALL LLC's
organization and storage system.™ StoreWALL LLC, an importer of
wall panels and HangUp locator tabs manufactured in Taiwan that
are used for home organization and storage systems, objected to
Customs' decision to classify the panels and tabs under Subheading
3926.90.98 of the HTSUS, a provision for "[o]ther articles of plastics
and articles of other materials of headings 3901 to 3914: Other:
Other."" StoreWALL urged Customs to "recïassify the panels and
tabs under Subheading 9403.70.80, a provision for 'Other furniture
and parts thereof: Furniture of plastics: Other'" and 9403.90.50, "a
provision for 'Other furniture and parts thereof: Parts: Others: Of
rubber or plastics: Other.'"'^ Subheadings 9403.70.80 and
http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/AboutTheCourt.htmlttjurisdi:tion (last visited Apr. 9,
2012) (explaining the jurisdiction of the CIT).
65. See StoreWALL, LLC v. United States, 644 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(noting that the GRIs "govern classifications under HTSUS").
66. Id.
67. See Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 491 F.3d 1334, 1536 (Fed. Gir.
2007) (describing the General Rules of Interpretation, framework as applied to
imported lighting fixtures).
68. Id.
69. 644 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
70. Id. at 1560.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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9403.90.50 are duty-free classifications that apply to "unit furniture"
and "parts" of unit furniture.'^
Customs refused to reclassify the panels and tabs and storeWALL
consequently commenced an action in the CIT, arguing that its wall
panels and locator tabs "are either 'unit furniture' or 'parts' of 'unit
furniture' covered under Heading 9403."^* Relying on the
Explanatory Notes from Heading 9403 and GRI 1, the CIT
nonetheless upheld Customs' classifications, finding that the panels
and locator tabs were excluded from the definition of "unit
furniture" under "the rack exclusion" for Heading 9403, which
excludes "other wall fixtures such as coat, hat and similar racks, key
racks, clothes brush hangers, and newspaper racks. "'^  StoreWALL
appealed to the Federal Circuit.™
The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that the CIT "appropriately
looked to the Explanatory Notes for clarification and in doing so
properly defined 'unit furniture'" under GRI 1, but misconstrued
"the rack exclusion."" Unlike a coat rack—which "will always be just
a coat rack"—the Federal Circuit reasoned that that "the end user has
the option with the storeWALL system to add or subtract accessories,"
such as shelving, cupboards, and baskets; in addition, the end user
could even remove all the hooks.™ As a result, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the "versatility and adaptability" of the storeWALL
system, which included panels and locator tabs, removed it from "the
rack exclusion" and warranted classification as parts of unit furniture
under HTSUS 9403.09.50.™
In Dell Products LP v. United States,^^ the Federal Circuit determined
that spare laptop batteries that were offered for sale individually, but
packaged with laptop computers for shipment, were "other storage
batteries" under the HTSUS Subheading 8507.80.80 and thus subject
to a duty rate of 3.4 percent.^' Dell Products LP (Dell) manufactured
and sold secondary batteries for use with laptop computers, which
provided "an additional power source that allows extended operation
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
. 80.
81.
Id
Id
Id at 1361-62.
M. at 1361.
Id at 1363-64.
M. at 1364.
Id
642 F.3d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
M. at 1056,1061.
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of the computer without an external power supply."*^ In this case,
secondary batteries were admitted separately from laptop computers
into Dell's Foreign Trade Sub-Zone (FTZ) ** in Nashville, Tennessee,
and placed into a box with a laptop computer.^* Dell attempted to
classify the secondary batteries as "portable digital automatic data
processing ["ADP"] machines," the classification for laptop
computers under HTSUS Subheading 8471.30.00.*^ Gustoms
determined, however, that "the secondary batteries were not 'put up
in sets for retail sale' with the laptop computers" under GRI 3(b) and
that "the secondary batteries therefore should be classified
separately" from the laptops.*®
Dell objected and filed an action in die GIT.*' The GIT upheld
Gustoms' determination and found that the batteries were "not
offered or displayed together for retail sale with the computer—the
computer [was] offered together with a power cord and primary
battery, and the secondary batteries [were] offered individually."
Thus, the secondary batteries were not "'put up together' with other
components of the retail set."** On appeal to the Federal Gircuit,
Dell challenged the GIT's determination under GRI 3(b), arguing
that the GIT erred in finding that the secondary batteries were not
"goods put up in sets for retail sale."*^ Dell argued that "Gustoms
cannot consider the manner in which its products were offered for
sale because the only point in time relevant to tariff classification is
82. Id. at 1056. A laptop's primary and secondary battery "cannot be used at the
same dme; once the primary battery dies, it is removed and replaced with a
secondary battery." Id.
83. "An FTZ is an area that is geographically within the United States but is
considered outside of tbe United States for customs purposes." Id. at 1056 n.l
(cidng BMW Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 241 F.3d 1557, 1559 n.l (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
Goods may be manipulated or manufactured within an FTZ into another item with a
different tariff classification before entry into the Unit^ sd States. See 19 U.S.C. §
81c (a) (2006) (lisdng the acdons that may be taken to manipulate goods within FTZs
prior to their final classificadon).
84. De«Proiis.LP, 642 F.5d at 1056.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1057. GRI 5(b) states: "Mixtures, composite goods consisdng of
different materials or made up of different components, and goods put up in sets for
retail sale . . . shall be classified as if they consisted of material or component which
gives them their essendal character, insofar as this criterion is applicable." U.S. INT'L
TRADE COMM'N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (2011),
available at http://wwrw.usitc.gOv/publicadons/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/l lOOgn.
pdf.
87. Dell Prods. LP v. United States, 714 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010),
affd, 642 F.5d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
88. DeUProds. LP, 642 F.3d at 1057 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 1057-58 (quodng U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 86, at 1 (lisdng
the General Rules of Interpretadon, including GRI 3(b))).
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the dme of entry into the United States."®" The Federal Circuit found
this argument without merit because, "[i]n many instances, goods are
offered for sale before they enter the United States for customs
purposes, meaning that Customs must inquire into the manner in
which the goods were presented for purchase to customers."^' Dell
further argued that "goods packaged together for shipment should
be treated in the same way as goods packaged together for sale, as
long as those goods are packaged together upon entry into the
United States."^^ The Federal Circuit disagreed, reasoning:
If distinct articles are put up in sets for retail sale, GRI 3(b)
provides that those articles are classified collectively according to
the material or component that gives them their essential
character. If the same articles are not put up in sets for retail sale,
GRI 1 provides that each article will be classified separately
"according to the terms of the [HTSUS] headings and any relevant
section or chapter notes."^^
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the judgment of the CIT
classifying Dell's secondary batteries as "other storage batteries"
comported with GRI 3(b) and affirmed the CIT's decision.^*
BenQ America Corp. v. United State^^ involved the tariff classificadon
of Dell liquid crystal display (LCD) monitors imported by BenQ
America Corporation (BenQ) from China in 2004.^ *^  The LCD
monitors were equipped with five different types of connectors for
receiving data: "(1) a 15-pin D-sub analog video connector; (2) a
DVl-D digital video connector; (3) an S-video connector; (4) a
composite connector; and (5) USB ports."^' BenQ entered the
monitors under HTSUS Heading 8471.60.45 (part of Secdon XVI of
the HTSUS), a duty-free provision for "[a]utomadc data processing
[ADP] machines and units thereof; magnetic or opdcal readers,
machines for transcribing data onto data media in coded form and
machines for processing such data."®* Customs classified and
reliquidated the monitors, however, under HTSUS Subheading
8528.21.70 (a part of Section XVI of die HTSUS), and assessed duties
on the monitors at the 5% rate called for under that subheading.®®
90.
91.
92.
95.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at
at
at
1058.
1059.
1060-61.
646 F.5d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at
at
1373.
1374.
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Subheading 8528.21.70 provides for "recepttion apparatus for
television . . . video monitors and video projectors."'""
BenQ protested the reclassification and ultimately filed an action
in the CIT, arguing that "the principal function of the Dell monitors
is to serve as a monitor for a computer or an automatic data
processing machine," thus qualifying BenQ's monitors for
classification under HTSUS Subheading 8471.60.45, based on a
"principal function" analysis under Note 3 to HTSUS Section XVI.'"'
Note 3 of Section XVI provided that,
[u]nless the context otherwise requires, composite machines
consisting of two or more machines fitted together to form a whole
and other machines designed for the purpose of performing two or
more complementary or alternative functions are to be classified as
if consisting only of that component or as being that machine
which performs the principal function.'"^
The CIT disagreed with BenQ and upheld the Government's
classification based on Note 5(E) to Chapter 84 of the HTSUS and
the Explanatory Notes to Heading 8471.'"^ Note 5(E) to Chapter 84
of HTSUS provides, in pertinent part: "'[m] achines performing a
specific function other than data processing and incorporating or
working in conjunction with an automatic data processing machine
are to be classified in the headings appropriate to their respective
functions or, failing that, in residual headings.'"'"'' As the Dell
monitors in question were capable of connection to a video source
for use as video monitors, the CIT determined that the monitors
could perform a specific function other than data processing and
thus could not be classified under heading 8471, but instead should
have been classified under Heading 8528.'°^ The CIT did not look at
Chapter 84, Note 5(B) because it concluded that Note 5(E) and the
Explanatory Note to heading 8471 were applicable.'"® Note 5(B) lists
three features that, if present, require that a unit be regarded as a
part of a complete automatic data processing system under heading
8471.'"'
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States ch. 84 § XVI n.3 (2012), available at http://www.usitc.gov/
publications/docs/ta ta/hts/bychapter/1200c84.pdf).
103. M. at 1374-75.
104. Id. at 1375 (quoting U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Harmonized Tariff Schedule
of the United States ch. 84-2 § XVI n.5(E) (2012), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/1200c84.pdf).
105. Id.
106. M. at 1379.
107. Id. at 1378 (explaining that for a unit to be considered part of a complete
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BenQ appealed to the Federal Circuit, asserting "tliat the [CIT]
should have determined . . . the 'principal function' of the Dell
monitors, as required by Section XVI, Note 3, HTSUS."'°^ BenQ
urged "that the monitors' 'principal function' [was] serving 'as an
output (display) unit of an ADP system' and that the monitors thus
should be classified in heading 8471 as 'units' of ADPs."'"^ The
Federal Circuit determined that the appropriate starting place for the
analysis in this case was Note 5 (B), a "principal use" analysis, and not
a "principal function" analysis in accordance with Note 5(E) and the
Explanatory Note to Heading 8471."° Indeed, the Federal Circuit
noted that the statutory requirements of Chapter 84, Note 5, "must
be met in order for the monitors to be classified under heading
8471."'"
The Federal Circuit reasoned that Note 5(B) is specifically directed
toward Heading 8471, while Note 3 of Section XVI is a note of
general application."^ Moreover, Section XVI, Note 3, is not
applicable when "the context otherwise requires," which the Federal
Circuit decided was applicable in this case."^ Because the CIT did
not reach Note 5(B) in its analysis, the Federal Circuit remanded the
case so the CIT could conduct a "principal use" analysis under Note
5(B) to determine the correct classification of the Dell monitors.""*
In GamelBak Products, LLG v. United States,^^^ the Federal Circuit
addressed a question of the proper tariff classification for a back-
mounted product with a cargo storage component and a hydration
component for "hands-free" hydration."^ In this case. Customs
classified the product as a conventional backpack under HTSUS
Subheading 4202.92.30 for "travel, sports and similar bags," which
carried a duty rate of 17.8% ad valorem."' CamelBak Products, LLC
(CamelBak) argued that its product was a "composite good" that
automatic data processing system, it must be (1) "solely or principally used in an
automatic data processing system," (2) "connectable to the central processing unit
either direcdy or through one or more other units" and (5) "able to accept or deliver
data in a form (codes or signals) which can be used by the system").
108. /¿.at 1577.
109. Id.
110. /d. at 1380.
111. /d. at 1578. Because two of the requirements were not at issue, the Federal
Circuit focused on Note 5(B)(a), which requires, for a unit to be recognized as a
complete system, that the unit be "solely or principally used in an automatic data
processing system." /d. at 1378.
112. /d. at 1380.
113. Id.
114. /¿.at 1380-81.
115. 649F.5d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
116. /¿.at 1362.
117. /d. at 1364.
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should be classified under HTSUS Subheading 4202.92.04 for
"insulated food and beverage bags . . . whose interior incorporates
only a flexible plastic container of a kind for storing and dispensing
potable beverages through attached flexible tubing" which carries a
duty rate of 7% ad valorem."^ The CIT upheld Customs'
classification by regarding the hydration component as an incidental
feature of the backpack."^ On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed
the CIT's classification determination as clearly erroneous and
remanded the case for consideration of the "essential character" of
the packs.'^ ^
The Federal Circuit utilized the GRIs for review of the
classification.'^' According to GRI 1, if an imported article is
described in whole by a single classification heading (or subheading)
or specifically named in an eo nomine provision, then that single
classification applies and the succeeding GRIs are inoperative.'^^ The
Federal Circuit analyzed several factors to determine whether a
product vrtth several components was "beyond the reach of [an] eo
nomine. . . provision" for purposes of GRI 1, including the article's
design, use, function, commercial treatment, and marketing.'^^
The Federal Circuit held that CamelBak's product could not be
classified eo nomine as a conventional backpack since the product's
primary design and use was to provide hands-free hydration, not to
provide cargo storage, and the product was sold at a higher price
than conventional backpacks and marketed differently.'^ "* The
Federal Circuit concluded that the hydration component feature was
not merely incidental to the cargo component but "provide [d] the
article with a unique identity and use that removes them from the
scope of the eo nomine backpack provision.'"^^ Since the Federal
Circuit determined that the good was classifiable under two or more
118. M. at 1363-64.
119. Id. at 1366; see also CamelBak Prods., LLC v. United States, 704 F. Supp. 2d
1335, 1346 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010) (reasoning that the addsd hydration features of the
backpack did not impact its classification as a backpack), rev'd, 649 F.3d 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
120. CamelBak Prods., 649 F.3d at 1368-70.
121. M. at 1364.
122. Id
123. M. at 1367-68.
124. M. at 1368-69.
125. Id. at 1369. The dissent deferred to the CIT's determination that the
improvement of the hydration component on the backpack was not such a
fundamental change in the item to remove it from still being classified as a member
of the eo womiwe backpack class. M. at 1370-71 (Bryson,J., dfissenting). The dissent
questioned the majority's conclusion that the CIT's determination wàs clearly
erroneous since evidence of distinct commercial treatment and marketing was
mixed. Id.
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headings or subheadings, GRI 3 required application of the "essendal
character" test to resolve the proper classificadon of the composite
good. This quesdon of fact was remanded to the GIT for
reconsideration.'^®
In Arko Eoods International, Inc. v. United States,^^'' the Federal Gircuit
affirmed a GIT holding that mellorine, a frozen dessert similar to ice
cream but made with vegetable or animal fat substituted for at least
some of the butterfat, was not properly classified as "an article of
milk" under HTSUS Subheading 2105.00.40.'28 The government
argued that mellorine should be classified as "an article of milk"
because the industry classified it as a dairy product.'^'
The Federal Gircuit began with GRI 1 by examining the terms of
2105.00.40 and relevant notes, but found that the terms did not
indicate what was required for something to be considered an article
of milk.'*" The court then turned to GRI 3, which explains that goods
with several components should be classified based on the "essential
character" test.'*' The Federal Gircuit determined that "the
appropriate definidon for an article of milk is a mixture with the
'essential character' of milk."'*^ Ultimately, die Federal Gircuit
concluded that mellorine lacked the essendal character of an article
of milk because milk powder is not the most preponderant
ingredient by weight or cost; thus, classificadon of mellorine under
Subheading 2105.00.40 was improper.'**
In LeMans Gorp. v. United Stotei,'** an iniporter of motocross jerseys,
pants, and motorcycle jackets, filed suit challenging Gustoms'
classification of the items as "wearing apparel" under HTSUS
Ghapters 61 and 62.'*^ LeMans Gorp. (LeMans) contended that the
subject merchandise should have been classified as "sports
equipment" under HTSUS Ghapter 95 because the articles were
necessary, useful, appropriate, and specifically designed for sport and
because the wearing apparel aspects of the merchandise were only
incidental to the merchandises' primary purpose.'*^ The GIT upheld
Gustoms' classification of the goods as "wearing apparel" and the
126.
127.
128.
129.
150.
151.
152.
155.
134.
135.
136.
Id. at 1365,1369-70
654 F.3d 1361 (Fed.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at
at
at
at
at
1362-64.
1364.
1364-65.
1365.
1365-66.
660 F.3d 1311 (Fed.
Id.
Id.
at
at
1313.
1315-16.
(majority opinion).
Cir. 2011).
Cir. 2011).
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Federal Circuit affirmed the determination.'^'
Applying GRI 1, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT correcdy
applied the dicdonary definitions of the terms and that the subject
merchandise was properly classified as wearing apparel.'^^ The
Federal Circuit noted that apparel can include árdeles intended for
athledc uses, such as "track suits, ski-suits, and swimwear."'^ ® LeMans
argued that the dual nature of its merchandise required the
applicadon of GRI 3, but the Federal Circuit determined that GRI 3
was inapplicable because the apparel items could not also be
considered "sports equipment."'*" The Federal Circuit relied on
Chapter 95's Explanatory Notes for guidance and support in
concluding that "sports equipment" encompasses árdeles that are
"not apparel-like and are almost exclusively prolecdve in nature."'*'
III. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAIUNG DUTIES
Broadly speaking, trade remedy laws aim to protect domesdc
industries that are injured by unfair import competidon.'*^
Enforcement of trade remedy laws is handled principally by
Commerce and the ITC.'*^ These agencies are responsible for
conducting anddumping and countervailing duty invesdgadons.
Antidumping dudes are imposed on imported goods that are sold at
less than "normal value," which in the first instance is the price at
which the same goods are sold in the home market.'**
Countervailing dudes (CVDs) are imposed on important goods that
benefit from government subsidies that provide an unfair advantage
in the U.S. market.'*^ Foreign producers subject to antidumping
dudes and CVDs often appeal to the CIT; in doing so, they challenge
the administrative decisions regarding the level of dumping or
subsidies (Commerce), the existence of some form of injury caused
137. M at 1314,1322.
138. Id. at 1317-18.
139. Id. at 1317.
140. M at 1318.
141. Id. at 1320. The Federal Circuit distinguished Bauer Nike Hockey USA, Inc. v.
United States, 393 F.3d 1246, 1248, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004), which held that ice-hockey
pants could be classified as sports equipment, by describing ice-hockey pants as
protective equipment similar to pads and guards. LeMam Corp., 660 F.3d at 1319.
142. See generally Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1681 (2006) (imposing
various duties on imported goods).
143. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 635 F.3d 550, 555 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(noting that the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over various sections of the TariflF Act
of 1950).
144. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673; iee also Zenith Elees. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d
1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that the duty is calculated by determining
the excess of the foreign market value of the merchandise over its U.S. price).
145. 19 U.S.C. §1671 (a).
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by the dumping or subsidies (ITC), or other aspects of the
administrative proceeding.
A. Department of Commerce
In SKE USA Inc. v. United States,^'^ the Federal Circuit affirmed
Commerce's statutory authority under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b and 19
U.S.C. § 1677(28) to use an unaffihated supplier's actual costs of
production (COP) in calculating constructed value (CV) and to
utilize zeroing'*' in connection with Commerce's review of
antidumping duty orders on ball bearings and parts.'** The Federal
Circuit vacated the CIT's decision in part and remanded, however,
because "Commerce failed to adequately explain its decision to
change its methodology" for calculating the CV.'*^
SKF and other bearing exporters were subject to an antidumping
duty order issued by Commerce with respect to sales of ball
bearings.'^" Commerce issued the original antidumping order in
1989.'*' Commerce thereafter periodically conducted administrative
reviews of the subject imports, determining the dumping margin in
part on the basis of SKF's acquisition costs.'^ ^ During üie seventeenth
review. Commerce, for the first time, required SKF and other
exporters "to produce actual COP and CV data from their
unaffiliated suppliers when a 'substantial proportion' of the . . . sales
were 'sales of merchandise production by unaffiliated suppliers.'"'^^
Since SKF was unable to obtain the data from SKF's unaffiliated
supplier, who was also a competitor. Commerce acquired the data
directly from the unaffiliated supplier.'^* Commerce also continued
146. 630 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
147. Zeroing refers to Commerce's practice of "zeroing" certain negative values
when calculating antidumping duties. Dongbu Steel Co. v. United States, 635 F.3d
1363, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Under the zeroing methodology, only positive
dumping margins are aggregated and negative margins are given a value of zero. Id.
at 1366. For a further discussion of zeroing, see infra note 268 and accompanying
text.
148. SKE USA Inc., 630 F.3d at 1367-68.
149. M. at 1368.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(A) (2006) (establishing the criteria by which
the dumping margin will be calculated).
153. SKE USA Inc., 630 F.3d at 1368-69. A dumping violation is determined using
the fair value, or "normal value," in the home market where the product is sold. Id.
at 1368. When Commerce is unable to determine the "normal value," 19 U.S.C. §
1677b (a) (4) requires a calculation of the CV based on the sales price in the home
market. Id. at 1368. The cost of materials and processing are used^  in calculating CV.
Id.; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1) (enacting special rules for imported merchandise
that will increase in value after importation into the U.S.).
154. SKE USA Inc., 630 F.3d at 1369.
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to utilize its practice of zeroing to calculate the dumping margins.'^ ^
SKF objected to Commerce "using unaffiliared suppliers' actual
cost data to calculate CV," noting that this data would yield a higher
COP and CV than acquisition costs, leading to a higher dumping
margin, and sought review by the CIT.'^ ^ The CIT affirmed
Commerce's authority, holding that, "although the statute does not
mandate that Commerce must use actual cost data, it unambiguously
allows Commerce to prefer the actual production costs of unaffiliated
suppliers of finished subject merchandise over acquisition costs."'^'
SKF also argued that Commerce's approach violated due process
because "SKJF cannot review its unaffiliated supplier's cost data and
cannot compel an unaffiliated company to provide such data."'^ ^ But
the CIT found that this was "not so substantial as to raise any
constitutional concerns," in light of SKF's counsel having had access
to the data and a chance to review it.'^ ® Finally, the CIT found "that
zeroing methodology was not impermissible."'^" SKF timely
appealed.'^'
The Federal Circuit affirmed that 19 U.S.C. § 1677b and 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(28) "unambiguously allow[] Commerce to prefer the actual
production costs of unaffiliated suppliers of finished subject
merchandise over acquisition costs."'^ ^ But the court also concluded
that Commerce did not provide a reasonable explanation for its
change in methodology after sixteen administrative reviews under
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Go.^'^^ The Federal Circuit noted two
important concerns raised by SKF that Commerce failed to address.
First, Commerce failed to address SKF's concern that it could not
change its pricing to avoid dumping because it would have no
knowledge of its unaffiliated supplier's actual production costs.'"
155. /d. at 1570.
156. Id.
157. /d. at 1371.
158. /d. at 1572.
159. Id.
160. /d. at 1370.
161. Id.
162. /d. at 1371.
165. 465 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). Under State Farm, factors to consider when
determining whether agency action is arbitrary and capricious are:
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it cotild not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Id. at 43.
164. SKF USA Inc., 630 F.5d at 1574 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b), (d), (e)(l).
1124 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1105
Second, "Commerce did not address SKF's concern that Commerce
would apply an adverse inference if the unaffiliated supplier failed to
provide cost data."'^ ^ As to SKF's due process concerns, the Federal
Circuit agreed with the CIT that the fact that SKF's counsel had
access to and a chance to review the data militated against any
constitutional violation.'®® Lastly, in response to SKF's contention
that "Commerce improperly used zeroing in calculating its weighted-
average dumping margin because it is prohibited by the [WTO]," the
court held that "application of zeroing to administrative reviews is not
inconsistent with the statute," and the WTO decisions cited by SKF
did not change U.S. law because they had not been implemented by a
statutory scheme.'^^
In Sahaviriya Steel Industries Public Co. v. United States,^^ the CIT
initially affirmed the Department of Commerce's decision to
reinstate a partially revoked antidumping duty order on certain hot-
rolled carbon steel flat products from Thailand, after a proper
Changed Circumstances Review (CCR) was conducted in response to
allegations of renewed dumping.'^^ Sahaviriya Steel Industries (SSI)
appealed to the Federal Circuit and argued that Commerce lacked
the statutory authority to reinstate a revoked antidumping order and
to conduct a CCR review once an order was revoked.'™ In
accordance with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,^''^ the CIT deferred to Commerce's statutory
interpretation of the agency's authority to conditionally revoke
orders under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d) and to conduct CCR proceedings
to review revocations under 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (b), and the Federal
Circuit affirmed."^
Commerce interpreted the revocation "in part" language in §
1675(d) to permit conditional revocation of an order, i.e. revocation
subject to reinstatement, if Commerce finds a resumption of
(f)) ("[EJxporters and producers who avoid dumping for three consecutive years
become eligible to have their antidumping orders revoked.").
165. Id
166. Id at 1372.
167. Id at 1375.
168. 649 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
169. M. at 1373.
170. Id at 1374.
171. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron deference requires that the reviewing court of
an administrative agency first determine whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. Id. at 843. Second, if the answer to the first step is yes, the
express intent of Congress governs. Id. at 843-44. If the answer is no, then the
reviewing court must determine whether the agency has rendered an interpretation
that is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843.
172. Sahaviriya Steel Indus., 649 F.3d at 1380-81.
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dumping."* SSI argued that once Gommerce revokes an order, it
cannot be reinstated without a new, formal injury determination."''
The Federal Gircuit disagreed and held "Jiat a new injury
determination was not required to reinstate a previously revoked
antidumping duty order when the revoked party's subject
merchandise is included in the original affirmative injury
determination."^ The court noted that requiring a new injury
determination would create an unnecessary administrative burden
and essentially allow evasion of dumping penaldes after refraining for
three consecutive years.'™
Gommerce interpreted § 1675(b) to provide broad authority to
conduct GGRs to address changed circumstances and allow for
reconsideration of antidumping duty determinations.'^' SSI argued
that, under § 1675(b), Gommerce's authority to conduct GGRs was
specifically limited to "final determinadons resulting in an order[,]"
and that the revocation of an anddumping order was not a "final
determination resulting in an order.""* The Federal Gircuit was
unconvinced and held that a GGR to reinstate could still be
considered a review of a "final determination resulting in an order"
because the inidal order remained valid and in effect and had been
reevaluated in light of changed circumstances: namely, SSI's
resumpdon of dumping.'™ Therefore, the Federal Gircuit held that
Gommerce properly conducted a GGR under the express authority of
§1675(b).'*"
In GPX International Tire Gorp. v. United States,'^^ the Federal Gircuit
held that current U.S. law prohibits application of GVDs to exports
from non-market economies (NMEs).'*^ Although Gommerce
traditionally refused to apply GVDs to exports from NMEs,'** in 2007
Gommerce determined that GVDs could be imposed on Ghina
because it was now possible to identify and measure subsidies
173. M at 1375 (cidng 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b) (2)(i)(B) (1999)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1378.
176. M at 1377.
177. M at 1378.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1380.
180. M at 1380-81.
181. No. 2011-1107, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25069 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2011).
182. Mat*14.
183. See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1317-18 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia; Final Negadve
Countervailing Duty Determinadon, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370 (May 7, 1984) (cidng the
conceptual and practical difficulty of idendfying and determining subsidizadon in
economies in which all costs, prices, and profits are already controlled by the state).
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provided to Chinese producers.'** Following Commerce's change in
policy in 2007, U.S. dre manufacturer Titan Tire Co. petitioned for
the imposition of CVDs and antidumping dudes on certain tires from
China, and Commerce conducted an investigation and imposed both
anddumping and countervailing duties.'*^ Seven complaints
subsequendy were filed in the CIT to contest Commerce's
determinations; these complaints were consolidated by the CIT.'®^
The CIT determined that "imposing both antidumping duties and
countervailing duties 'could very well result in a double remedy,'"
and remanded the action.'®' "On remand. Commerce decided to
offset the countervailing duties against the antidumping dudes on
the same merchandise to avoid this double counting problem. "'^ ^
The CIT found Commerce's approach unreasonable because: (1) "it
rendered the countervailing duty investigation 'unnecessary because
the same remedial price adjustment can be obtained by merely
conducting an NME [antidumping] invesdgation'" and (2) "the
offset is 'inconsistent with 19 U.S.C. § 1677a, which lists the specific
offsets to export price and constructed export price that are
permissible,' and which does not list offsets for countervailing duties
based on domesdc subsidies."'*® The CIT "again remanded [the
case] to Commerce with instrucdons not to impose countervailing
dudes."'®" The United States and the U.S. manufacturers favoring the
imposition of countervailing duties dmely appealed to the Federal
Circuit.'®'
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's judgment, but on a
different and much broader ground. The court concluded that
Congress "legisladvely ratified" Commerce's pre-2007 posidon that
CVDs could not be applied to NIVIE countries when it amended and
reenacted the CVD law in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA).'®^
Specifically, the court highlighted that, in 1988, the House of
Representatives inserted a provision into the Omnibus Trade and
184. Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China: Amended
Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,484
(Apr. 9, 2007).
185. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732, 734 (Fed. Cir. 2011), affg
645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1235-36 (Ct. IntU Trade 2009).
186. M. at 736.
187. Id.
188. Id. 2X12,1.
189. Id. (quoting GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2010)).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 754.
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Competitiveness Act that would expressly make CVD law applicable to
NMEs, but the provision was rejected by the House-Senate
conference committee.''^ The court found that Congress's rejection
was "persuasive evidence" that Congress did not wish to. apply CVDs
to NME imports.'^* Moreover, the court concluded that Congress
again ratified the prevailing Commerce interpretation in the URAA
when the legislature reenacted most of the CVD law but proclaimed
in the legislative materials that the definition of "subsidy" would not
be changed.'^^
The court further reasoned that, when Congress amended and
reenacted the URAA and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, it was aware of the court's decision in Georgetown Steel
Corp. V. United States,^^^ and thus "ratified the prevailing
interpretation."'^' In Georgetown Steel Corp., the court held that 19
U.S.C. § 1671 "does not compel the imposition of countervailing
duties to goods from NME countries because the government
payments with respect to such goods are not 'bounties or grants,' or
'countervailable subsidies' in the current terminology."'^* Indeed,
the court pointed out that a House Committee Report of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 directly cited
Georgetown Steel and Congress "rejected a statutory provision to
supersede it." '"^
In concluding its decision, the Federal Circuit left Commerce and
(indirecdy) Congress with an invitation: "if [Commerce] believes
that the law should be changed, the appropriate approach is to seek
legislative change."^"" The Executive and Legislative branches were
quick to take up the challenge with the passage of remedial
193. M. at 740.
194. M. at 741 (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id. at 743.
196. 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
197. CPXInt'l Tire Corp., 666 F.3d at 739.
198. Id. at 738 (citing Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1314).
199. Id. zt 742.
200. Id. at 745. The legislation expressly allowed Commerce to apply
countervailing duty provisions to NMEs such as China and Vietnam. See H.R. 4105
(f)(l), 112th Cong. (2012). Congress applied the legislation retroactively, including
all proceedings initiated on or after November 20, 2006. See H.R. 4105 (b) (1). The
legislation also addressed the "double counting" issues raised by the Federal Circuit
in GPX International Tire Corp. and by the WTO in United States—Definitive Anti-
dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Produx:ts frori China (DS379) (Mar. 11,
2011). In this regard, if Commerce can "reasonably estimate the extent to which the
countervailable subsidy . . . has increased the weighted average of the dumping
margin," then Commerce will "reduce the antidumping duty by the amount of the
increase in the weighted average dumping margin." See H.R. 4105 (f) (1).
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legislation, signed by the President, on March 13, 2012, 85 days after
the Federal Circuit issued its opinion.^"'
The Federal Circuit addressed the obligation of a court to remand
a case to an administrative agency when new evidence indicates that
the agency's proceedings were tainted by material fraud in Home
Products International, Inc. v. United States.^"^ In this case, the Federal
Circuit held that the CIT "abused its discretion in declining to
remand" the case to Commerce in connection with an administrative
review of an antidumping order covering fioor-standing metal-top
ironing tables from the People's Republic of China.^ "^ In the first
and second administrative reviews of the antidumping order.
Commerce calculated dumping margins of 0.45 percent and 0.34
percent, respectively, for Since Hardware (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd.
(Since Hardware), a Chinese exporter of ironing tables.^ "'' The
plaintiff. Home Products International, Inc. (Home Products),
initiated an action in the CIT challenging Commerce's second
administrative review, alleging that "Commerce calculated an
improperly low dumping margin."^"^ While Home Products'
challenge was pending. Commerce was conducting its third
administrative review of the same antidumping order, when new
evidence "indicated Since Hardware had submitted falsified
documents to Commerce during the third administrative review. "^ "''
It was alleged that Since Hardware submitted falsified certificates of
origin to Commerce, which "likely allowed Since Hardware to obtain
a decreased dumping margin. "^ °^  Specifically, it was alleged that the
certificates of origin made it appear that Since Hardware had
purchased more than thirty-three percent of the inputs in question
from a market economy country, which "qualify [] the entirety of
those inputs to be valued based on [a] weighted-average price,"
rather than a less favorable surrogate market-economy country.^ "^
The certificates contained typographical errors, a different certificate
numbering system, a dififerent stamp, and different signatures.^"^
201. Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions to Nonmarket Economy
Countries, Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 (2012).
202. 633 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
203. /d. at 1371.
204. Id. at 1571-72.
205. Id. at 1372.
206. See id. ("Commerce concluded that documents were unreliable and
inaccurate.").
207. /d. at 1373.
208. Id.; see also id. at 1572-73 (providing a more detailed discussion of the nature
of the alleged falsification).
209. S««¿d. at 1373-74.
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Thereafter, Commerce concluded its third administrative review,
finding that Since Hardware had provided "'unreliable and
incomplete documentation in support of its claimed purchases of
market economy inputs'" thereby increasing Since Hardware's
dumping margin.^'"
Home Products moved to amend its complaint in light of the
alleged fraud and challenged the second administrative review.^" In
denying the motion, the CIT declined :o go beyond the
administrative record under review, noting tha; Commerce had not
found a "fraud" in the third administrative review, but simply
"unreliable" and "inaccurate" documents.^'' Next, the CIT
concluded that Home Products failed to show that the second
administrative review contained any false information.^'^ The Federal
Circuit disagreed with the CIT, holding that "Commerce has inherent
authority to reopen a case to consider new evidence that its
proceedings were tainted by fraud" and that there is no difference
when a fraud is discovered while the agency proceeding is on
appeal.^ '"* Next, the Federal Circuit concluded that Home Products
had presented clear and convincing evidence 'that Since Hardware
was guilty of fraud in the second administrative review" because Since
Hardware's certificates from the second review contained the same
discrepancies as the certificates from the third administrative review,
including: "the same typographical errors, different certificate
numbering system, different stamp date, and noticeably different
signatures."^"' The Federal Circuit remanded the case in order to
ascertain the views of Commerce as to whether a fraud existed. '^^
In Zhejiang DunAn Hetian Metal Co. v. United States,^^^ DunAn, a
Chinese producer of front-seating service valves (FSVs), challenged
Commerce's antidumping duty calculation.^'* Specifically, DunAn
challenged: (1) Commerce's inclusion of data from other countries
when calculating the NME surrogate values for raw material inputs;
(2) Commerce's application of an adverse inference regarding
missing sales quantity data; and (3) Commerce's calculation of the
210. See id. at 1374 (determining that the dumping margin determines the size of
the antidumping duty imposed; the larger the margin, the greater the duty).
211. M. at 1375.
212. Id at 1376.
213. Id
214. Id at 1377.
215. M. at 1380-81.
216. Id
217. 652 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
218. Id at 1334-36,1339.
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labor factor of production.^'^ Since Ghina is deemed a NME,
Gommerce relied on surrogate values to calculate normal value in the
dumping calculation.^^"
Gommerce selected India as the surrogate market economy for
calculadon of the normal value of the FSVs.^ '^ Gommerce used the
World Trade Adas India import data to determine the surrogate
value of brass bars, a primary input for FSVs.^ ^^  DunAn objected to
the World Trade Adas India import data set's inclusion of import
data from Japan, France, and the UAE, claiming that the material
imported from these countries was incorrecdy classified as brass
DunAn based its objecdon on another data set, Infrodrive
* Gommerce disagreed and issued a final determination in
which it refused to exclude the imports from these countries because
it determined that the Infodrive India data was inconclusive on the
question of correct classification of the brass bars.^ ^^
During its investigation, Gommerce was "unable to verify DunAn's
sales data for December 2007" due to DunAn's failure to provide
"accurate and verifiable data."^^" Even during verification, a process
required before issuing a final determinadon, Gommerce found the
data unclear.22' Under 19 U.S.G. § 1677e(a), Gommerce can use
"facts otherwise available" to fill gaps in data when "necessary
information is not available on the record. "^ *^ It can also use an
adverse inference under 19 U.S.G § 1677e(b). if it finds that the
interested party has not cooperated to the best of its ability.^ ^^ Thus,
in this case, Gommerce applied an adverse inference for the
information it found incalculable on the basis of DunAn's record in
its final determinadon.^*"
Finally, Gommerce calculated the labor factor of production "using
regression analysis that included wage rate data from sixty-one
market economy countries."^*' DunAn objected and argued that the
calculation was improper because it relied on "data from countries
that are neither economically comparable to Ghina nor significant
219.
220.
221.
222.
225.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at
at
at
at
at
See\9
Du
Id.
nA
at
1355-36.
1336.
1340-41, 1545.
1559.
1545 (cidng 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(l) (2006)).
U.S.C. §1677e(b).
71, 652F.5datl545.
1559.
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producers of comparable merchandise."^^^ Commerce rejected this
argument and included the analysis is its final determination.^^^
DunAn appealed to the CIT, challenging, among other issues.
Commerce's: (1) calculation of NME surrogate values for raw
material inputs; (2) Commerce's application of an adverse inference
on missing sales quantity data; and (3) Commerce's calculadon of the
labor factor of producdon.^^*The CIT denied DunAn's modon,
sustaining Commerce's final determination in all respects;
consequendy, DunAn appealed to the Federal Circuit.^ '^'
The Federal Circuit addressed each issue seriatim. The Federal
Circuit deferred to Commerce's determinadon on the calculation of
the surrogate value for brass bars because the World Trade Adas
India import data, as opposed to the Infodrive data, was the "best
available information."^^®
With respect to the adverse inference, DunAn argued that
Commerce could have calculated a transaction-specific dumping
margin for the missing sales with verified data in the record, so it did
not need to resort to any adverse inference.^^' DunAn claimed that
the only missing data related to quandty, which DunAn argued was
not necessary to the calculadon of the dumping margin in this
particular case.^ *^ The Federal Circuit agreed that it was possible to
calculate a transaction-specific dumping margin without sales
quandty because the FSVs were sold at a predetermined gross price
per unit.^ ^® It reasoned:
" [W] hen units are sold and the only data related to the sale is the
gross price, you must know the quantity of units sold to determine
gross price per unit. Quandty sold is not required, however, when
a unit is sold at a predetermined gross unit price; if the gross unit
price is already known, it is, by definition, independently
verifiable."^ *"
Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that it was improper for
Commerce to apply an adverse inference.^*' The Federal Circuit
acknowledged and DunAn conceded that "the quantity of the FSVs
sold in December 2007 is required to determine DunAn's overall
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at
at
1340.
1341,1345 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (20C6)).
at 1346.
at
at
at
1347-48.
1347.
1348.
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dumping margin."^*^ The Federal Circuit ultimately determined that
"[b]ecause Commerce could calculate the transaction specific
dumping margin for these FSVs with the missing information, it was
improper for Commerce to apply" an adverse inference and
remanded the case to the CIT "with instructions to use a partial
[adverse inference] in selecting the quantity of the December 2007
sales of the FSVs at issue for purposes of calculating the relevant total
dumping margin."^*^
Lasdy, the Federal Circuit concluded that Commerce's calculation
of the surrogate value of labor was improper because it failed to
incorporate data from economically comparable countries that are
significant producers of comparable merchandise as required by
Dorbest Ltd. v. United States.^'^ Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
remanded to the CIT for proper valuation of labor costs as well.^ **
In QVD Eood Co. v. United States,^'^^ QVD, an exporter of frozen fish
fillets of genus pangasius (pangas fish) from Vietnam, challenged the
final results of Commerce's administrative review of an antidumping
duty order.^*' Since Vietnam is deemed a NME, Commerce selected
Bangladesh as the surrogate market economy for the calculation of
normal value.^ *® In its preliminary results. Commerce valued whole
pangas fish based on the financial statement of the Bangladeshi
pangas fish producer Gachihata for the 2006-2007 fiscal year (FY
2006-07) and used FY 2006-07 financial statements from two other
Bangladeshi seafood producers to calculate financial ratios for
general expenses.^ *® Based on these values. Commerce assigned QVD
a de minimis dumping margin.^ ^"
Six days before the deadline to issue final results. Commerce
placed a UN report on fish prices in the administrative record.^^'
Commerce invited comment about the appropriateness of using the
UN's report for determining surrogate value.^ ^^ In the end.
Commerce declined to use the report due to concerns about
reliability and ultimately relied on an infiation-adjusted value from
the 2000-2001 fiscal year (FY 2000-01 statements) Gachihtata financial
242. Id. at 1347.
243. M. at 1348.
244. Id. at 1349 (citing 604 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
245. Id.
246. 658F.3dl318(Fed. Cir. 2011).
247. Id. at 1320.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. M. at 1321.
252. Id.
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statement for the value of whole pangus fish.^ *' After Commerce's
final results were announced, QVD alleged that Commerce
committed ministerial errors by double counting general expenses
for the financial ratio.^ ^* Commerce refused to change its financial
ratio calculations^^^ and QVD appealed to the CIT.^ ®^
The CIT sustained Commerce's decision, concluding that
Commerce provided "reasonable grounds" for using financial
statements of a Bangladeshi fish producer from the FY 2000-01
statements and that QVD's challenge to the financial ratio was raised
too late.2 '^
QVD appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging Commerce's
antidumping duty calculation by arguing that Commerce should have
used contemporaneous data such as the UN report or FY 2006-07
statements.^ ^*
The Federal Circuit held that Commerce did not abuse its
discretion by declining to use the UN report and the FY2006-07
statements to value the fish, because Commerce has broad authority
to determine the best available information for an antidumping
review and its decision was supported by substantial evidence.^ ^® The
Federal Circuit concluded that Commerce reasonably decided to rely
on the well-vetted data from the FY2000-01 financial statements when
it faced doubts about the UN report's methodology and reliability.^ ™
Commerce's subsequent decision to use the UN report in new
shipper reviews did not alter the Federal Circuit's conclusion about
Commerce's decision not to use the UN report in the review involved
in the appeal.^ '^ Moreover, the Federal Circuit noted that
Commerce's decision not to rely on the FY2006-07 statements was
reasonable because they were deemed unreliable, as they related to a
company that was on the verge of financial collapse.^ ''^
The Federal Circuit also held that Commerce's assignment of
certain expenses in calculating the financial ratio was not an
inadvertent arithmetic or clerical error; it was a deliberate
methodological choice, and thus could not be considered a
255.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 1321-22.
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
1322-23.
1322.
1522-23.
1323-24.
1524.
1524-25.
1525-26.
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"ministerial error. "^ ^^  Moreover, the Federal Circuit noted that even
if it were a ministerial error, QVD failed to raise it in a timely manner
because it was discoverable during the preliminary proceedings.^"
Commerce's practice of zeroing in calculating antidumping
margins has generated significant controversy and discussion over the
years.^ ^^  Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit has upheld Commerce's
use of zeroing as reasonable at least seven times over the past decade,
most recently in SKF USA Inc}^ Commerce traditionally practiced
zeroing in both investigations and administrative reviews.^ '^ Zeroing
is the practice of including positive dumping margins in calculating
the overall margin, but counting negative dumping margins as
In response to a decision by the WTO Appellate Body, and
pursuant to U.S. law providing for the implementation of adverse
WTO rulings. Commerce discontinued the practice of zeroing in
investigations, but has continued the practice in administrative
reviews.^ ^^  In this regard, the Federal Circuit has opined that the
statutory text applicable to both investigations and administrative
reviews—namely the term "exceeds" in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35) (A)—is
sufficiently ambiguous with respect to the zeroing practice, and the
Federal Circuit therefore has traditionally deferred to Commerce's
decision of whether to use zeroing in both stages of its antidumping
procedures.^ ™ Indeed, the Federal Circuit recently affirmed
263. Id. at 1328.
264. Id
265. See Dongbu Steel Co. v. United States, 635 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(summarizing the arguments for and against Commerce's zeroing authority); see abo
ThyssenKrupp Acciai Speciali Terni S.p.A. v. United States, 603 F.3d 928 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (referring to some of the challenges to the zeroing practice at the WTO).
There have been, and continue to be, several WTO rulings that are inconsistent with
tiie obligations of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.
266. See Dongbu Steel Co., 635 F.3d at 1365 n.l (listing cases in which the court
upheld Commerce's zeroing authority).
267. See id. at 1366 (explaining that the court has upheld Commerce's use of
zeroing in both investigations and administrative reviews).
268. More specifically, zeroing is used in the following manner. In antidumping
proceedings. Commerce "first calculates the dumping margin equal to the amount
by which the normal value exceeds the export price or constructed export price." Id.
(internal citations omitted). Then, Commerce "calculates a weighted-average
dumping margin by dividing the aggregate dumping margins determined for a
specific exporter or producer by the aggregate . . . constructed export prices of such
exporter or producer." Id. Then "only positive dumping margins (i.e., margins for
sales of merchandise sold at dumped prices) are aggregated and negative margins
(i.e., margins for sales of merchandise sold at non-dumped prices) are given a value
of zero." Id.
269. SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 630 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
270. Corus Staal BV v. Dep't of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343,1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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Gommerce's change in its zeroing policy in U.S. Steel Gorp. v. United
States.^''
In an important decision issued this year, however, the Federal
Gircuit restricted Gommerce's freedom to use zeroing in Dongbu Steel
Go. V. United States.^'^^ • • . . .
In Dongbu Steel Go., the Federal Gircuit addressed "whether
Gommerce is entided to deference when it interprets 19 U.S.G. §
1677(35) inconsistendy."^'* In 2005, Gommerce commenced its
twelfth administrative review of certain corrosion-resistant carbon
steel flat products from the Republic of Korea using the zeroing
methodology.^'* Later, Gommerce discondnued its policy of zeroing
in investigations, but condnued to use the zeroing methodology in
administrative reviews, which included the final results in the
corrosion-resistant carbon steel fiat productions review.^'* The
plaintiff. Union Steel Manufacturing Go. (Union), filed suit, arguing
that
it is unreasonable under Chevron for Commerce to construe the
identical statutory provisions—19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)—to have
opposite meanings in investigations and administrative reviews
where (1) nothing in the statutory language indicates that different
interpretations were intended and (2) this court has rejected the
claim that the meaning of § 1677(35) depends on the stage of the
anddumping proceeding.^™
The GIT disagreed and sustained Gommerce's final results.^"
Union appealed.^'*
After reviewing its prior decisions, the Federal Gircuit concluded
that it had "never addressed the reasonableness of Gommerce's
interpretation of 19 U.S.G. § 1677(35) with respect to administrative
reviews now that Gommerce is no longer using a consistent
interpretation.""^ Thus, the Federal Gircuit was not bound by prior
case law and would "apply Ghevron step two analysis anew."^*" First,
the Federal Gircuit concluded that 19 U.S.G. § 1677(35) was
ambiguous.^*' After doing so, the court acknowledged that
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
62]
63Í
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
I F.3d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
) F.3d 1363,1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
at 1568.
at 1368-69.
at 1568.
at 1369.
at 1371.
at 1572.
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"Commerce plays an important role in resolving [the extant] gap in
the statute," but declared nonetheless that "Commerce's discretion is
not absolute"; consequendy. Commerce was required to provide
statutory support for its inconsistent interpretation.^*^ Commerce
proffered a single explanation for the inconsistent interpretation:
"The methodology for invesdgations was changed in response to an
adverse WTO report. "^ ^^  Although the Federal Circuit agreed that
Commerce was entided to change its interpretadon to respond to the
adverse WTO decision, the court retorted, citing Chevron, that
"Commerce's interpretation of the statute must comply with domesdc
law including reasonably interpreting statutes."^** Applying the
Chevron step two analysis, the Federal Circuit concluded that
Commerce failed to "provide [] a reasonable explanation for why the
statute supports such inconsistent interpretadons."^** The Federal
Circuit further commented: "It may be that Commerce cannot justify
using opposite interpretadons of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35) in
investigadons and in administrative reviews. Under such
circumstances. Commerce is of course free to choose a single
consistent interpretadon of the statutory language."^®®
Later in the year, inßEKT Corp. v. United States,^^'' importers of ball
bearings from Japan challenged Commerce's use of zeroing in its
eighteenth administradve review, relying on Dongbu.^^^ The Federal
Circuit found in favor of the importers, holding that Dongbu required
that the court vacate and remand the case "in order for Commerce to
explain its reasoning for its current practice."^*® In so holding, the
Federal Circuit noted:
It is not illuminating to the continued practice of zeroing to know
that one phase uses average-to-average comparisons while the other
uses average-to-transaction comparisons. In order to satisfy the
requirement set out in Donghu, Commerce must explain why these
(or other) differences between the two phases make it reasonable
to continue zeroing in one phase, but not the other. Thus, we
282. Id. The Government' argued that "inconsistent interpretations are
permissible and contemplated by Congress," but the Federal Circuit noted that it had
"expressly adopted the position taken by the government in earlier cases that there is
no statutory basis for interpreting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(55) differently in investigations
than in administrative reviews." Id. at 1371.
283. Id. at 1372.
284. Id.
285. /¿.at 1375.
286. Id.
287. 642 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
288. Id. at 1380.
289. /d. at 1384.
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vacate in order for Commerce to provide its reasoning.^ "^
inJTEKT Corp., importers of ball bearings from Japan appealed the
final results of Commerce's administrative review by challenging the
calculations underlying the final determination.^^' In analyzing the
sales made during the review period. Commerce switched methods of
calculating the price of similar merchandise frcm the "family model
match" method to the "sum of the deviations" method. '^'^  The
importers responded by arguing that the "sum of deviations" method
was less accurate.^ ^* The CIT sustained Commerce's methodology,
holding that Commerce was free to use the "sum of deviations
method," that it was reasonable for Commerce to refuse to add an
extra characteristic to its analysis and that Commerce had
considerable discretion in "breaking ties."^ ^* On appeal, the Federal
Circuit agreed and upheld Commerce's change to the "sum of the
deviations" approach as reasonable, deferring to Commerce's design
of the method.^ ^^
Since the "sum of the deviations" method may result in more than
one match. Commerce developed a tie-breaker system.^ ®® Commerce
first looks to the level of trade and contemporaneity of the sales; if
this does not break the tie, then Commerce selects the product with
the lowest difference in manufacturing cost (DIFMER) .'^ ®' The
importers argued that Commerce's tie-breaking method was
improper and DIFMER should be considered first because, unlike
level of trade and contemporaneity, which speak to the characteristics
of a particular sale, DIFMER relates to the more important
290. M. at 1384-85.
291. M. at 1380.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1381. Under the family model match mechod. Commerce considers
sales of products in the exporter's home market that have the same physical
characteristics as the United States sale, by evaluating, in this case, eight
characteristics. Id. at 1380. Any merchandise that shares the eight characteristics are
considered part of a family and the price of the family is averaged. Id. Under the
sum of the deviations method, the matching sale only needs to be identical on four
of the eight characteristics. Id. For each of the remaining four characteristics.
Commerce determines a percentage difference and then adds up all four
percentages. Id. If the sum total of these percentage differences is less than 40%,
then the merchandise is considered similar. Id.
294. JTEKT Corp. v. United States, 717 F. Supp. 2d 13-22, 1329-30 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2010), vacated, 642 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011). "Breaking ties" refers to situations in
which two products (or two characteristics) are considered equally similar.
Commerce has to make some choice as to which is most similar—that is, how to
"break the tie."
295. ß'EKT Corp., 642 F.3d at 1379, 1382. The Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded the CIT decision on other grounds, specifically leaving Commerce's use of
the model match methodology untouched.
296. Id. at 1382.
297. Id.
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consideration of a good's physical characteristics.^^* The Federal
Circuit disagreed and deferred to Commerce's system because the
statute was silent as to tie-breaking methodology and the system was
In Saha Thai Steel Pipe (Public) Go. v. United States,^°° the Federal
Circuit addressed the "duty drawback adjustment" under 19 U.S.C. §
1677a(c) (1) (B), which increases the export price ("EP") of a product
that benefited from rebated or unpaid import duties in its country of
origin.^"' During an administrative review of an antidumping duty
order covering carbon steel pipes from Thailand, Commerce
determined that Saha, a Thai producer of carbon steel pipes that
exports its products to the United States, "received duty
exemptions . . . for its inputs of hot-rolled steel coil and zinc that
Saha incorporated into the carbon steel pipes it exported to the
United States." Accordingly, Commerce increased Saha's EP to
account for the unpaid duty.^ "^  Commerce also "included the
exempted import duties in Saha's cost of manufacture, thereby
increasing" Saha's cost of production (COP) and constructed value
(CV).^ °^  Commerce reasoned that "the cost of the exempted duties
should be included in Saha's cost of manufacture."^°''
Both Saha and domestic producers Allied Tube and Conduit Corp.
and Wheadand Tube Company (interested U.S. manufacturers)
challenged Commerce's decision before the CIT.™^ The domestic
producers contended that Commerce erred in making the duty
drawback adjustment, while Saha argued that Commerce properly
treated the duty drawback adjustment, "but erred in including the
exempted import duties in its COP and CV."^ °" The CIT affirmed
Commerce's decision in all respects except for the yield factors used
298. /d. at 1383.
299. /d. at 1382-83.
300. 635 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
301. Id. at 1338. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(l)(B) provides that the EP "shall be . . .
increased by . . . the amount of any import duties imposed by tbe country of
exportation which have been rebated, or which have not been collected, by reason of
the exportation of the subject merchandise to the United States." Increasing the EP
results in a decrease of any antidumping margin. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C S
1677a(c)(l)(B) (2006)). f & B V e
302. Id. at 1358-39.
303. Id. at 1339. "CV and COP are closely related. The major components of
COP are (1) the cost of mantifacture; (2) 'selling, general, and administrative
expenses'; and (5) packaging expenses." Id. at 1338. COP and CV are used to
determine the normal value (NV) of a product in market economy countries such as
Thailand, /d. at 1338.
304. /d. at 1339.
305. Id. at 1358-39.
306. /d. at 1339.
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in calculating the cost of production.^"' On remand. Commerce
recalculated the dumping margin and the CIT affirmed the
recalculation and entered final judgment.^"*
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's decision.^ "^ The
domestic producers argued that Saha was not eligible for the dtity
drawback adjustment because it received an "exemption" instead of a
duty imposition that was later rebated.*'" Concluding that the
domestic producers' argument was without merit, the Federal Circuit
upheld Commerce's reading of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) (1) (B) because a
plain reading of the statute contemplated that "a duty drawback
adjustment shall be granted when, but for the exportation of the
subject merchandise to the United States, the manufacturer would
have shouldered the cost of an import duty" and this case
"present[ed] the precise circumstances that the statute . . . intended
to address."*" Applying Chevron deference, the Federal Circuit
likewise affirmed Commerce's decision to include the import duties
in Saha's COP and CV.*'^  Referencing the basic accounting principle
of "matching," the Federal Circuit opined that "[i]t would be illogical
to increase EP to account for import duties that are purportedly
reflected in NV, while simultaneously calculating NV based on a COP
and CV that do not reflect those import duties."^'*
B. International Trade Commission
In Canadian Wheat Board v. United States,^^* the Federal Circuit
addressed
whether, after a [NAFTA] binational panel has invalidated a
federal antidumping duty order and [Commerce] has revoked the
order, the invalidated duties that had been deposited prior to the
date of that determination but that had not been liquidated, may
307. Id. Saha challenged Commerce's "application of Saha's actual yield factors
when calculating the drawback adjustment instead of the yield factors established by
the Thai government." Id.
308. 7d. at 1340.
309. M. at 1344.
310. Id. at 1340. Specifically, the domestic producers argued that, "[b]ecause
inputs imported and stored in Saha's bonded warehouse received an exemption
from import duties upon entry into Thailand rather t&an a post-duty rebate, the
domestic produces contend that no import duties were ever actually imposed' on
Saha as required by statute." Id.
311. M. at 1341.
312. Id
313. M. at 1342-43.
314. 641F.3dl344(Fed. Cir. 2011).
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be recovered from the United States by the depositors of those
duties.*'^
In 2003, Gommerce determined that Ganadian wheat had been
sold in the United States at less than fair value, and the ITG made the
required injury finding.*'® In the next year, the Ganadian Wheat
Board deposited the anddumping dudes on its wheat entering the
United States, but liquidation of those duties was suspended when
the Ganadian Wheat Board requested an annual review of those
duties.*" The Ganadians challenged the Gommission's injury
determination before a NAFTA binational panel, which "found that
there was not substantial evidence in the record that the 'dumping'
had materially injured the domestic wheat industry." *'* As a result,
the panel remanded the case.*'^  The Gommission then reversed its
inidal determination, finding that the importation of Ganadian wheat
did not materially injure the domesdc industry.*^" The domestic
wheat industry challenged the remand-determination, but the
NAFTA panel affirmed the finding, which became effective on
January 2, 2006.* '^
Gommerce subsequendy revoked the antidumping duty order, but
stated that the "revocadon does not affect the liquidation of entries
made prior to January 2, 2006" and instructed Gustoms to liquidate
those earlier entries.*^^ The Ganadian Wheat Board filed suit in the
GIT "to enjoin Gommerce from liquidating the antidumping duties
on its wheat imported prior to January 2, 2006," and also sought the
return of those duties.*^* The GIT determined that the duties should
not be collected because "the entries were suspended and
unliquidated when the antidumping duty order was revoked," and
the importers were thus entided to return of the antidumping dudes
deposited at the dme of entry.*^^  The Government appealed.*^*
The Federal Gircuit affirmed the GIT's decision, characterizing
Gommerce's action as "extraordinary and seemingly arbitrary," and
finding that "[n] either the statute nor its legislative history 'suggests
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
522.
323.
324.
325.
M at 1346.
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1548.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that Congress intended to produce such an inequitable result.'"^ ^®
The court concluded that "[o]nce the NAFTA panel had finally
determined that the unliquidated anddumping duty order was
invalid—a ruling not subject to judicial review . . . Commerce had no
valid basis for retaining the unliquidated dudes that the Canadians
had deposited pursuant to that order. "^ '^
In Papierfabrik August Koehler AG v. United States,^^^ a non-
precedendal opinion, the Federal Circuit overruled the CIT's
decision affirming the ITC's determinadon that Papierfabrik August
Koehler AG's and Koehler America's (Koehler) dumping of Light
Weight Thermal Paper (LWTP) posed "a threat of material injury to
a domestic industry. "^ ®^
In this case. Commerce analyzed seven Koehler products and
found that "six of the seven products had positive dumping margins,"
meaning they were being sold at less than fair market value
(LTFV) .''^ " The only product without a positive dumping margin was
Koehler's 48 gsm LWTP product, which "consdtuted 38.15 percent of
Kohler's quantity of sales in the United States and made up 40.28
percent of the value of sales in the United States."^ '^ Imports of 48
gsm LWTP were increasing.
In the investigation. Commerce defined LWTP as "'thermal paper
with a basis weight of 70 [gsm] (with tolerance of + 4.0 [gsm] or
less.'"^ ^^ Commerce did not separate out the 48 gsm because LWTP
"allegedly was not physically distinct enough to become a separate
Before the Commission issued it final determination, Koehler
"requested that the Commission disregard the increased shipments of
48 gsm jumbo rolls because they were the one product without a
posidve dumping margin."^** The Commission refused, relying on
Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States"^^ for the proposition that the
326. Id. at 1349 (citing Asociación Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v.
United States, 916 F.2d 1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
327. Id. at 1350. The Government made several otiher arguments, which the
Federal Circuit quickly dismissed. See id. at 1550-51 (dismissing several government
arguments, including the government's contentions that 19 U.S.C. § 5512(c) barred
suit and that the court should defer to Commerce's reasonable interpretation of the
statute).
528. 415 F. App'x 227 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
529. Id. at 228 (noting the unique circumstances of the case).
550. W. at 229.
531. /d. at 229-50.
332. Id. at 229.
333. Id. at 230.
334. Id.
335. 865 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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Commission could :not consider "intermediate individual product
dumping margin calculations."^^® The Commission ultimately found
that the LWTP paper industry was threatened with material injury,
"almost entirely based on the impact" of 48 gsm jumbo rolls, even
though the rolls were not being sold at LTFV.^ '^ The CIT affirmed
the Commission's determination and Koehler appealed to the
Federal Circuit.^ ^*
The Federal Circuit held that "[w]hen the threat determination is
based almost exclusively on one product with the subject
merchandise, and that one product is not being sold at LTFV, the
Commission should be able to use all materials at its disposal to make
an equitable determination."^*® Accordingly, the court found that the
Commission incorrecdy denied Koehler's request to consider
"potentially dispositive intermediate data," namely the dumping
margin of 48 gsmjunibo rolls.^ *"
The Commission petitioned the court for a panel rehearing and
rehearing en bane, which the court denied in a precedential opinion,
Papierfabrik August Koehler AG v. United States.^'^^ Three judges
dissented from the denial of the petition, arguing, among other
things, that the panel misapplied Algoma Steel Corp. to this case and
departed from "long-standing precedent."**^
W. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION: SECTION 337 CASES
Unlike its jurisdiction to review Customs and International Trade
decisions—in which the review is of the CIT decision reviewing
administrative decisions—the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to review
decisions by the ITC under Section 337 of the Trade Act is direct.
The administrative decisions do not go to the CIT, but rather go
direcdy to the Federal Circuit. This is a vestige of the system of
review that existed in the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
the predecessor of the Federal Circuit.
In John Mezzalingua Associates, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission,^'*^ PPC, a manufacturer of coaxial cable connectors, filed
a complaint with the ITC asserting that the importation of certain
coaxial cable connectors infringed its design patent and violated
336. Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, 4:13 F.App'x at 230.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. M. at 232.
340. Id.
341. 646 F.3d 904 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ).
342. Id. at 907-09.
343. 660 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.^ '*'' Section 337 prohibits the
importation of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable U.S.
patent of a domestic industry.^ ''^  The "domestic industry" element
requires a showing of: "(A) significant investment in plant and
equipment; (B) significant employment or labor or capital; or (C)
substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering,
research and development, or licensing. "^ *^
The ITC determined that PPC failed to satisfy the "domestic
industry" requirement and PPC appealed.^'" The Federal Circuit
affirmed the ITC determination, holding that litigation expenses
incurred in asserting and defending the validity of the patent did not
constitute a "substantial investment in exploitation" of a patent
through licensing. '^'* The Federal Circuit concluded that expenses
associated with ordinary patent litigation "should not automatically
be considered a 'substantial investment in . . . licensing' even if the
lawsuit happens to culminate in a license." '^'^  The court held that
PPC failed to make a substantial investment in licensing, relying on
the lack of evidence of pre-litigation licensing efforts and licensing
negotiations during the lawsuit, as well as a lack of formal licensing
program, which indicated that litigation expenses were not
connected to licensing efforts.* "^
In TianRui Group Go. v International Trade Gommission,^^^ the Federal
Circuit held that the ITC has the authority to look to extraterritorial
conduct in the course of a trade secret misappropriation investigation
if it is necessary to protect domestic industries from injuries arising
out of unfair competition in the domestic marketplace.^^^ In this
case, TianRui, a Chinese manufacturer, allegedly misappropriated a
U.S. manufacturer's trade secret by hiring employees away from a
licensee. These employees allegedly disclosed the U.S.
manufacturer's proprietary and confidential process for producing
cast steel railway wheels.^ ^^
When TianRui exported the wheels to the U.S., the domestic
344. Id. at 1324.
345. 19U.S.C. §1357(a)(l)(B)(i) (2006).
346. /d. §1357(a)(5).
347. John Mezzalingua Assocs., 660 F.3d at 1324.
348. /d. at 1329-31.
349. /d. at 1328.
350. Id. The dissent believed that additional fact-finding was required to
determine if PCC's expenditures could be considered "a substantial investment in
exploitation" of a patent for the domestic industry requirement. Id. at 1331.
351. 661 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
352. Id. at 1324.
353. Id.
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manufacturer filed a complaint with the ITC asserting that the
importation violated section 337 because the wheels were
manufactured using its misappropriated trade secret.*^ "* TianRui
argued that Congress did not intend for section 337 to be applied
extraterritorially and that the application of section 337 to alleged
misconduct in China would improperly interfere with Chinese law.*^ ^
The ITC found that the wheels were manufactured using a process
that was developed in the United States, protected under domestic
trade secret law, and misappropriated abroad in violation of section
Section 337 prohibits unfair methods of competition, including the
misappropriation of trade secrets and unfair acts in the importation
of articles into the U.S. that negatively affect an industry in the
United States.* '^ Applying a single federal standard for what
constitutes a misappropriation of trade secrets, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the ITC's determination that TianRui misappropriated the
secret process by obtaining access to the U.S. producer's confidential
information.*''^  The Federal Circuit concluded that the general
presumption against the extraterritorial application of laws did not
apply to Section 337 because: (1) the focus of section 337 is on an
inherently international transaction; (2) the foreign "unfair" conduct
at issue has a domestic nexus; and (3) legislative history implies
consideration of conduct that occurs abroad.*^^ The Federal Circuit
noted that since the ITC's exercise of authority is limited to foreign
conduct only insofar as it relates to goods imported into the U.S.,
there was no conflict with Chinese law.*^ " Moreover, China, as a
member of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) Treaty, is subject to the same general principles of trade
secret misappropriation law.*®'
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that it was proper for the ITC
354. M. at 1325.
355. Id. at 1332. TianRui also argued that there was no "domestic industry injury"
for purposes of Section 337 because the U.S. manufacturer had discontinued use of
the misappropriated process. Id. at 1335. The Federal Circuit disagreed and
affirmed the ITC injury determination based on evidence indicating that the
imported wheels directiy competed with similar wheels domestically produced by the
trade secret owner. Id. at 1337.
356. Id at 1324.
357. 19U.S.C. §1337(a)(l)(A)(i) (2006).
358. TianRui Grp. Co., 661 F.3d at 1327.
359. M. at 1329-30.
360. Id at 1332.
361. Id. at 1332-33; see Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the Worid Trade
Organization, art. 39, annex lC, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (setting forth
misappropriation requirements that mirrored the obligations that the administrative
law judge applied in the instant case).
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"to find a secdon 337 violadon based, in part, on acts of trade secret
misappropriadon occurring overseas."*®^ In particular, the Federal
Gircuit was concerned about evasion of secdon 337 through a
"loophole" allowing misappropriafion of U.S. trade secrets abroad
with immunity.*''* The dissent objected to the extraterritorial and
anti-competidve implications of the decision.*®*
In another section 337 action. Tessera, Inc. v. International Trade
Gommission,^^^ Tessera, Inc. filed a complaint with the ITG on
December 21, 2007, alleging patent infringement by importers of
certain semiconductor chips.*®® The patents at issue were U.S. Patent
Nos. 5,663,106 (die '106 patent); 5,679,977 (the '977 patent); and
6,458,681 (die '681 patent).*®^ The '106 patent concerns
"innovations preventing contaminadon of exposed terminiils on
packages during encapsulation" of semiconductor chips.*®* A
semiconductor chip (chip) is a widely used miniaturized electronic
circuit.*®® "A semiconductor package (package) protects these
delicate chips from mechanical and thermal damage. Most modern
packages protect the chip by encapsulating it with a molded plastic,
generally referred to as 'encapsulant.'"*™ The problem with the
encapsulant, however, is that it may contaminate the miniature
electrical terminals on the exterior of those packages.*"
During encapsulation, the '106 patent describes using an
encapsulate barrier and a protective barrier as the encapsuladon
area.*'^  The patent describes a material called "solder mask," but also
permits the use of "'any other means which protects . . . the terminals
from coming into contact vñth encapsulant."*'* The products
accused of infringement at issue on appeal used a laminate-based
package substrate named "wBGA."*'"* Otherwise, the accused
products were similar in most respects.*'^  wBGA consisted of a stack
of three layers—a laminate substrate layer (a solid foundational
layer), a copper wiring layer above it, which "provide[d] for the
362. TianRui Grp. Co., 661 F.3d at 1352.
563. Id. at 1350, 1533.
364. /á. at 1343.
565. 646 F.5d 1357, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
366. Id. at 1560, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
367. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
368. Id. at 1561, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
369. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
370. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
371. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
572. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
575. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
574. Id. at 1362, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871-72.
375. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871-72.
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controlled fiow of electrical signals," and a solder mask layer on top
to prevent corrosion of the copper.^ '® •
Concluding that there was no section 337 violadon, the ITC issued
a final determinadon on January 4, 2010, stating that the wBGA
products did not infringe.^" Tessera sought review by the Federal
Circuit on multiple grounds, challenging: (1) the Commission's
claim construction of the '106 patent; (2) the Commission's finding
of no infringement by wBGA products; and (3) the Commission's
finding of patent exhaustion.^'* Finally, Tessera sought to vacate the
Commission's decision as to the expired '977 and '627 patents.^ '®
The Federal Circuit agreed with the ITC that there was no patent
infringement because "f^ or the wBGA packages, the laminate-based
substrate core layer represents the claimed 'top layer,' and because
the 'protecdve barrier' does not come into contact with that layer,
the wBGA packages do not infringe the asserted claims of the '106
patent. "^ °^ Indeed, the Federal Circuit further agreed with the ITC
that the "laminate substrate layer of the accused wBGA products
corresponded to the 'top layer' . . . of the '106 patent," not the solder
mask layer. ^ *'
With respect to patent exhaustion. Tessera argued that it never
authorized sales of its licenses because royaldes were never paid or
were paid late in some cases.^ *^  The Federal Circuit disagreed,
finding that Tessera's licensees were authorized to sell the accused
products and nothing in the licenses limited the licensee's ability to
sell, even if royalty payments were late.^ *^ The Federal Circuit further
376. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871-72.
377. Id. at 1363, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. Another group of patents were
also at issue during this action, but were not raised on the appeal. The other group
of products had a polyimide-based package substrate (pBGA). Id. at 1362, 98
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871-72.
378. Id. at 1363, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. The Commission and intervener
Elpida Memory, Inc. and Elpida Memory (USA) Inc. (collectively, Elpida),
challenged the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit with respect to patent exhaustion,
arguing Tessera did not timely appeal the issue. Id. at 1367, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1875. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the ITC did not render final
determination until December 29, 2009, and that Tessera filed a timely notice of
appeal within 60 days ofthat date. Id. at 1569, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876-77.
579. Id. at 1371, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
380. Id. at 1365, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Federal Circuit noted that "[t]he issue of infringement ultimately turns upon
which layer is identified as the 'top layer.'" Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
581. Id. at 1564-65, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. The Federal Circuit further
noted that the '106 patent "describes using 'solder mask' as the preferred material
for the protective barrier, not the top layer, and, at times, even use[d] the term
'solder mask' interchangeably with 'protective barrier.'" Id. at 1565, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1874.
382. Id. at 1369-70, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
383. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
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noted that, in some cases, "royalty obligations do not accrue until
eight months after the licensed products are sold."^ ** Finally, with
respect to the '977 and '627 patents, the Federal Circuit found the
portion of appeal pertaining to these patents moot and remanded to
the ITC "with instructions to dismiss as moot the portion of the
complaint relating to those patents."*^^
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit continues to develop a rich body of
precedential case law, furthering the transparency and consistency of
United States international trade law. This year was no exception.
The majority of the decisions of the Federal Circuit in 2011 addressed
tariff classifications. Commerce's authority to impose antidumping
and countervailing duties, and Commerce's calculations of
antidumping duties. The decisions in GPX International and Dongbu
were perhaps surprising because the Court refused to defer to
Commerce's practice with respect to zeroing and the application of
CVD law to non-market economy countries. The Federal Circuit's
decisions, however, were based on unsurprising principles of
statutory interpretation. The Federal Circuit reaffirmed its
commitment to issuing fair and well-reasoned decisions, interpreting
the governing statutes, and requiring administrative actions pursuant
to these laws to be consistent with established principles of
administrative law and judicial precedent.
384. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
385. Id. at 1371, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
1148 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1105
ADDENDUM
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Prcicdcntial Derisions Ksiit'd b^ Ihc (cdcial (.lrcuit m
20111 III Chron<ilc>gt< al O i clei )
SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 630 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
Home Prods. Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 633 F.3d 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
Saha Thai Steel Pipe (Pub.) Co. v. United States, 635 F.3d
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 635 F.3d 550 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
StoreWALL, LLC v. United States, 644 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
Dongbu Steel Co. v. United States, 635 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
Canadian Wheat Bd. v. United States, 641 F.Sd 1344 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
Dell Prods. LP v. United States, 642 F.3d 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
Papierfabrik August Koehler AC v. United States, 646 F.3d
904(Fed. Cir. 2011).
Department
of Commerce
Department
of Commerce
Department
of Commerce
Bureau of
Customs and
Border
Protection
Bureau of
Customs and
Border
Protection
Department
of Commerce
International
Trade
Commission
Bureau of
Customs and
Border
Protection
International
Trade
Commission
Ruling
Affirmed
in part,
vacated in
part, and
remanded
Reversed
and
remanded
Affirmed
Reversed
and
remanded
Reversed
and
remanded
Vacated
and
remanded
Affirmed
Affirmed
Denial of
petition
rehearing
en bane
2012] 2011 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW DECISIONS 1149
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Tessera, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 646 F.3d 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
BenQ Am. Corp. v. United States, 646 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
CamelBak Prods., LLC v. United States, 649 F.3ci 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
Sahaviriya Steel Indus. Pub. Co. v. United States, 649 F.3d
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Zhejiang DunAn Hetian Metal Co. v. United States, 652
F.3dl333 (Fed Cir. 2011).
Almond Bros. Lumber Co. v. United States, 651 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
JTEKT Corp. v. United States, 642 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 648 F.3d 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
Arko Foods Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 654 F.3d 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
QVD Food Co. V. United States, 658 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
LeMans Corp. v. United States, 660 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
John Mezzalingua Assocs., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 660
F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
International
Trade
Commission
Bureau of
Customs and
Border
Protection
Bureau of
Customs and
Border
Protection
Department
of Commerce
Department
of Commerce
United States
Trade
Representative
Department
of Commerce
Bureau of
Customs and
Border
Protection
Bureau of
Customs and
Border
Protection
Department
of Commerce
Bureau of
Customs and
Border
Protection
International
Trade
Commission
Affirmed
in part,
vacated in
part, and
remanded
Vacated
and
remanded
Reversed
and
remanded
Affirmed
Vacated
and
remanded
Reversed
and
remanded
Vacated
and
remanded
Reversed
and
remanded
Affirmed
Affirmed
Affirmed
Affirmed
1150 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1105
22
23
24
TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 661 F.3d 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
Hitachi Home Elees. (Am.), Inc. v. United States, 661 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
International
Trade
Gommission
Bureau of
Customs and
Border
Protection
Department
of Commerce
Affirmed
Affirmed
Affirmed
on
different
grounds
Copyright of American University Law Review is the property of American University Washington College of
Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright
holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
